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Although research on individual and organizational status 
has deepened our understanding of each, to date, little attention has 
been paid to the interlinkages between the two. Drawing from the 
status literature, we suggest that how organizations value the status 
of CEOs will differ depending on their organizational context, 
namely organizational status. To address this, we develop a notion of 
status disparity, which refers to the relative dominance of CEO status 
over firm status. Specifically, we explore how the relative standing of 
the CEO with respect to the firm may affect CEO valuation and 
examine the impact of such status disparity on CEO-level outcomes: 
 
CEO power, compensation, and dismissal likelihood. Empirical 
results from the panel data set of CEOs in S&P 500 firms supported 
that the CEOs with greater status disparity are more likely to have 
higher power and receive greater compensation. The findings 
indicate that the perceived value of CEO status is linked to 
organizational status, thus exhibiting how stakeholder’s perception 
and attribution can be explained through the idea of status disparity.  
Keywords: CEO Status, CEO power, CEO compensation, CEO 
dismissal likelihood 
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In a market context, the quality of an actor is hard to verify ex-ante 
due to information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970). So we often rely on various 
social perceptions to indirectly measure the quality of the subject (Podolny, 
1993; 1994). Status, or one’s relative position in the social hierarchy (Sauder, 
Lynn, & Podolny, 2012; Washington & Zajac, 2005), serves two functions. 
First, status projects the competence level of the focal actor. Individuals or 
organizations are willing to engage with high-status actors because they are 
believed to have greater competence than others (Darley & Gross, 1983). 
Here, status mainly functions as a quality signal of a focal actor, especially 
when the direct quality assessment of focal actor is imperfect (Podolny, 1993). 
Regarding competence, high-status generates a higher performance 
expectation from audiences (Philips & Zukerman, 2001) and also endows 
greater accessibility and/or greater value of the resources and opportunities 
(Lin, 1999; Thye, 2000). Second, status creates deference from others. High-
status actors are respected or admired by others (Ridgeway & Walker, 1995; 
Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001). The prominence of high-status 
ensures the focal actor not only to enjoy greater control over the 
environment (Lin, 1999; Gould, 2003; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980) 
but also to receive greater rewards (Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006; 
Graffin, Wade, Porac & Mcnamee, 2008). Moreover, as a way of expressing 
 2 
deference, audiences tend to show higher approval tendency towards high-
status actor’s performance (Pettit & Sivanathan, 2012). 
The complex characteristic of status distinguishes itself from a 
similar, socially constructed perception: reputation. Though earlier studies 
have used status and reputation interchangeably (e.g., Shrum & Wuthnow, 
1988), recent studies have started to distinguish reputation and status and 
examine their relationship and effects on various individual and firm-level 
outcomes (Washington & Zajac, 2005; Jensen & Roy, 2008; Stern, Dukerich, & 
Zajac, 2014; Pollock, Lee, Jin & Lashley, 2015). Prior studies highlight the 
theoretical distinctiveness of each social perception. While reputation is an 
economic related construct that is highly dependent on the actor’s previous 
performance, status is a social construct derived from actor’s relative 
standing in the society (Sorenson, 2014). To be specific, since status is formed 
through third parties’ action or evaluation on an actor, the audience type 
takes a significant role on status development. Multiple audiences, who are 
facing different types of concern and uncertainty, shows a different 
perspective on the evaluation of the actor (Ertug, Yogev, Lee & Hedstrom, 
2015; Pontikes, 2012; Cattani, Ferriani & Allison, 2014). Therefore, status has 
its own unique social effect that cannot be fully explained from a purely 
economic perspective. Based on the status literature, we conclude that the 
audience-specific nature provides a great opportunity for a multi-level 
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analysis. 
Although a substantial body of literature has advanced our 
understanding of status in both individual and organizational level, 
however, so far, little attention has been paid to the dynamics of status in 
organizational settings. We know very little, for instance, about the linkage 
between the status of the actors and the status of their own organization. 
Given that their perception and decision making are influenced by the 
broader social structure that they are embedded within (Granovetter, 1985, 
Uzzi, 1996), examining such dynamics would provide a keen insight on 
status in an organizational context. In this paper, we explore the interplay 
between CEO-level status and firm-level status. Prior studies have shown 
that status of CEO is associated with greater reward and power (Graffin, 
Wade, Porac & McNamee, 2008; Belliveau, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1996). 
However, scholars have not yet examined the role of organizational status in 
such processes. We believe that the dynamics between two different levels of 
status – the individual CEO and the organization – will provide a deeper 
understanding of the antecedents of CEO governance issues, as well as how 
the perception and attribution of stakeholders may vary by different status 
configurations.  
In this paper, we focus on the notion of status disparity, or the 
relative difference between CEO and firm level status. We attempt to 
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identify the value of status disparity by looking at three CEO level outcomes: 
CEO power, compensation, and dismissal likelihood. Analyses of data from 
S&P 500 firms between 2002 and 2006 confirm our main arguments. Our 
results suggest that the status disparity between the CEO and his firm tends 
to enhance his sociopolitical standing in the organization, as manifested in 
his power and compensation. To date, our study is the first to consider the 
role of absolute and relative status of a CEO with respect to the 
organizational status.  
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Status in a Business Context 
 For many years, the concept of status has attracted a great deal of 
attention from strategy and organizational scholars (e.g., Belliveau et al., 
1996; D’Aveni, 1996; Chung, Singh & Lee, 2000). Status is generally defined 
as a socially constructed perception based on a relative standing in the social 
hierarchy (Washington & Zajac, 2005, Weber, 1978). This definition suggests 
that status is a relative construct, which is only identifiable in a collective 
sense and is conferred only by audiences with their respective uncertainty 
and interest. Because of its socially situated nature, the effects of status have 
been regarded to be complex and overlapping with other related constructs.  
 First, as much research suggests, high-status actors have greater 
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advantages compared to low-status actors in the context of market 
exchange.1 Here, status is mainly regarded as a tool to indirectly measure an 
actor’s economic competence. Starting with Podolny (1993), researchers have 
shown that status serves as a signal of quality. In the market where direct 
quality observation is imperfect, actors prefer to affiliate with high-status 
actors because of the high level of expected competence of the actor (Spence, 
1974). Regarding quality signal, Matthew Effect suggests that status is 
generally associated with the greater level of status attainment afterward 
(Merton, 1968b). However, status is not always favorable to the focal actor in 
an economic transaction context. Inverse Matthew Effect claims that high-
status position can also magnify negative consequences when firms face a 
failure (Jensen, 2006). Furthermore, based on actors’ perceived level of 
competence, high-status actors tend to have easier access to resources (Lin, 
1990; 1994), price advantages (Podolny, 1993), and more opportunities 
(Jensen, 2004). These advantages of status tend to be pronounced under 
situation with greater uncertainty in the environment (Podolny, 1994).  
 Second, high-status actors receive greater deference from others. 
Individuals or organizations show their esteem to high-status actors by 
ensuring greater control or greater rewards to the focal actor for any given 
performance (Gould, 2003; Merton, 1968b). For example, research has shown 
                                                     
1 If not otherwise specified, actors refer to both individuals and organizations. 
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that CEOs, after earning a high-status, receive higher compensation from the 
organization (Graffin et al., 2008; Malmendier & Tate, 2009). Also, audiences 
tend to posit lower performance standards (Washington & Zajac, 2005) or 
show greater approval tendency (Pettit & Sivanthan, 2012) as a means to 
show admiration to the high-status actor.  
 How do some individuals and organizations manage to gain high 
status while others fail to do so? The prior research indicates that the actual 
and perceived abilities, prior performances, and affiliations with others can 
be main sources of status. The complex mixture of quality and social 
standing creates what we call a “status" (Podolny, 1993; Piazza & Castellucci, 
2014). In same sense, CEO status is formed by the combination of various 
sources like CEO attributes including educational background, prior 
performance, and previous and current working occupations’ status 
(Harrison, Torres & Kukalis, 1988; Beliveau, et al., 1996; Bidwell, Won, 
Barbulescu, & Mollick, 2014). Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to directly 
observe the attributes and ability of potential and current CEO, we often rely 
on third-party evaluations such as media attribution or certifications to 
measure the CEO’s quality which in turn become a base of status 
development (Hayward, Rindova & Pollock, 2004; Graffin, et al., 2008). 
Likewise, firm status is developed from multiple sources like prior financial 
performances, affiliation with other firms in the industry, and its rankings 
 7 
and certification from third-party institutions (Podolny, 1993; Stuart, Hoang 
& Hybels, 1999; Lin, Yang, & Arya, 2009).  
 At times, status-seeking actors prefer to affiliate with high-status 
actors in anticipation of resource usage and status spillover (Stuart et al., 
1999; Pollock & Gulati, 2007). Status is transferable to other affiliated actors 
because the affiliation itself signals the underlying quality. For these reasons, 
CEOs have a preference for working at a high-status firm, and firms also 
want to hire a high-status individual for a CEO position if all other factors 
remain unchanged. CEOs believe that working at a high-status firm will 
signal their managerial ability and aid their career development (Phillips, 
2001; Graffin et al., 2008). Likewise, firms are also eager to hire a high-status 
CEO with greater managerial competence and valuable network ties 
(Belliveau et al., 1996). Hiring high-status actors will not only bring firms to 
have a heightened expectation regarding firm performance but also draw 
greater attention from media and stock market (Malmendier & Tate, 2009; 
Hayward et al., 2004). Thus, employing a high-status CEO will signal to both 
inside and outside stakeholders to have greater performance expectation 
towards the organization. Therefore, both firm and CEO status act as a 




2.2. Status in a CEO-Firm Relationship 
 Considerable evidence has shown that an actor’s tendency to affiliate 
with similar actors, is a crucial antecedent of relationship formation (e.g., 
Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954). While actors are eager to get benefit from high-
status affiliations, high-status actors actively try to defend their status 
(Bothner, Kang & Stuart, 2007). Generally, they tend to invest more to meet 
expectations coming from high-status (Eden, 2003; Pettit & Lount, 2010). 
They also attempt to protect their status by undertaking strategic changes to 
recover or rebuild status as the loss in status leads to dampened economic 
and social values (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Gephart, 1978). To prevent 
the possible threat to their status, high-status actors will actively try to avoid 
status incongruent situations (Pearce, Ramirez, & Branyiczki, 2001). 
 When looking at the relationship between CEO and the firm, in most 
cases, a low-status CEO will be more likely to work at a low-status firm, 
while a high-status CEO will be more likely to work at a high-status firm for 
the following reasons. First, the CEO and the firm evaluate each other based 
on its social standing and estimate their competence. Therefore, high-status 
firms will look for a high-status CEO whose perceived managerial quality, 
regardless of his actual quality, best suits to the firm. Also, CEOs expecting 
status spillover from the firm, which will eventually benefit them in the 
labor market, will prefer to work at a firm whose status is equal to or greater 
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than their status. Firms, having a concern on status degradation by affiliating 
with low-status actors (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999), will also prefer to hire 
CEOs whose status is equal to or greater than firm status.  
However, anecdotally and empirically, relationship with status 
disparity does exist between the CEO and the organization. High-status 
CEOs working at a low-status firm or low-status CEOs at a high-status firm 
can be categorized into this status disparity. Low-status actors may be 
motivated to affiliate with high-status actors since they could gain status 
(Stuart et al., 1999). In contrast, high-status actors have relatively low 
motivation to associate with low-status actors since there is a great amount 
of uncertainty and threat of status loss in the relationship (Podolny, 1994). 
Nevertheless, prior studies did find that high-status actors have a unique 
advantage when affiliating with low-status actors. For example, Castellucci 
& Ertug (2010) found that high-status actors enjoy a greater level of 
commitment from the low-status actor while paying lower price. Moreover, 
He and Huang (2011) argued that status hierarchy defines a clear and 
distinct role of each participant; the empirical results also showed that the 
directors with unequal levels of status reach consensus on their decisions 
more easily, ultimately with a positive impact on performance. 
Although there seem to be certain benefits linked with status-
heterophilous ties, most studies have found that actors feel status disparity 
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uncomfortable and try to overcome this disparity by changing their position. 
For example, Pearce et al. (2001) show that executives make 
an organizational change to overcome status incongruence in communist 
transition economies. Similarly, the study by Hambrick & Cannella (1993) 
examines the departure decision of executives under their relative status 
degradation. Therefore, if when status disparity exists between the CEO and 
the firm, we expect that the firm with relatively low status must compensate 
the higher status CEO for maintaining the relationship. 
 
2.3. The Conceptual Framework of CEO Status and Firm Status 
 
To explore the dynamics between CEO status and firm status, we 
divide CEO and firm status into two levels – high and low – and define four 
distinct situations. Figure 1 shows the two-by-two matrix of CEO status and 
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firm status. Note that this framework addresses the relative (not nominal) 
status between the CEO and the firm. 
 
Situation I: High CEO Status and High Firm Status 
 Situation I is characterized by a high-status CEO at a high-status firm. 
The high statuses of both parties are the outcome of consistent quality 
demonstration and their position in the market. Examples in this quadrant 
would include Bill Gates at Microsoft, Jack Welch at General Electric, and 
Steve Jobs at Apple Inc. A CEO in this situation is often recognized as the 
“big player”, who has a strong influence in both the organization and the 
industry and receives a great amount of attention from the inside and 
outside stakeholders (Hayward et al., 2004). The similarity between CEO-
level and firm-level status reduces the uncertainty for its future actions and 
performance (Podolny, 1994; Lynn, Podolny & Tao, 2009). In addition, both 
the high-status CEO and the firm, with a strong desire to prevent status 
spillover, would attempt to maintain their own respective status (Podolny, 
1993; Benjamin & Podolny, 1999). Beyond maintaining its status quo, the 
high-status CEO and the high-status firm are likely to create a synergy, 
which in turn positively impacts the level of status, since high-status actors 
are more likely to develop status more quickly than low-status actors 
(Podolny & Philips, 1996; Merton, 1968b). Mutual reciprocity exists between 
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two parties, and the benefits and costs of being each other’s affiliation are 
well balanced (Gould, 2002). Thus, in this quadrant, one would expect that 
both CEOs and firms to have a strong motive to maintain the relationship. 
 
Situation II: Low CEO Status and High Firm Status 
 Situation II is characterized by a low-status CEO at a high-status firm. 
First-time CEOs in the high-status firm without any demonstrated 
managerial ability can be categorized as this quadrant. Examples would 
include Sundar Pichai at Google or Anne Mulchany at Xerox. Here, relative 
standing of the firm is greater than the CEO and thus the firm takes relative 
dominance over the CEO in status, which makes ‘small frog in a big pond’ 
situation (Frank, 1985). This over-dominance will make the CEO to have 
relatively low level of managerial discretion while facing a great amount of 
pressure to live up to expectations of the high-status firm. Under pressure, 
the low-status CEO is more likely to follow the norm of the organization and 
even try to compensate the reward that he or she receives by affiliating with 
the high-status firm. 
 From the firm’s perspective, in order to resolve this status disparity, 
high-status firms may adjust the level of CEO reward to compensate the 
possible spillover of firm status to the CEO. In addition, the firm would 
expect a greater level of commitment from the low-status CEO while 
 13 
providing relatively low reward than the high-status CEO (Castellucci & 
Ertug, 2010). In turn, low-status CEOs would be willing to tolerate relatively 
low reward in terms of power and compensation to compensate their 
advantage for working at a high-status firm (Hamori, 2006). Moreover, we 
believe that the CEO’s performance will be relatively underrated compared 
to his peers in the industry and the pay gain will remain modest even when 
firm performance improves substantially in a given year since the 
performance attribution to the CEO will be less likely to appear. 
 
Situation III: Low CEO Status and Low Firm Status 
 Situation III is characterized by a low-status CEO at a low-status firm. 
Low-status firms lack in their resources and also receive little attention from 
their audiences (Philips & Zuckerman, 2001). As such, they would generally 
hire similar low-status CEOs. Relatively unrecognized, small and recently 
founded firms are likely to belong to this group, bearing liability of newness 
and smallness. Here, those CEOs and firms whose status is not established 
or identified yet because of their recent introduction to the network are 
categorized as low status. Situation III is similar to Situation I where the 
level of CEO status and that of firm status is similar; however, there are 
significant differences with respect to status advantages. Both the CEO and 
the organization have no status asset to create any advantages, which makes 
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both not that attractive in the external market. In this situation, we believe 
that there is a balance between the bargaining power of the CEO and the 
firm so that corporate governance issues would be mostly determined by 
economic related performance and established norms. 
 
Situation IV: High CEO Status and Low Firm Status 
 Situation IV is characterized by a high-status CEO at a low-status 
firm. Similar to Situation II, there is a status disparity between the CEO and 
the firm – but in the opposite direction. Firms and CEOs in this quadrant can 
be categorized into two cases: 1) low-status CEOs at a low-status firm 
suddenly gaining one’s status and 2) low-status firms scouting a star CEO 
exceptionally to enjoy status advantages from its CEO. Example figures 
could be Scott McNealy, former CEO of Sun Microsystems, who recently 
joined at Wayin and Dick Costolo, former CEO of Twitter, who launched a 
fitness startup. 
 In both cases, status disparity exists between the CEO and the firm, 
which creates the relative dominance of the CEO over the firm. To borrow 
Frank (1985)’s expression, this quadrant displays ‘a big frog in a small pond’ 
situation. Compared to Situation I, where both CEO status and firm status is 
high, high-status CEOs are highly visible in the low-status firm. Under 
status disparity, high-status CEOs and low-status firms have two different 
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motives to gain benefit and be compensated. On one hand, low-status firms 
will expect status spillover by bringing a high-status CEO to the firm. To 
affiliate with high-status CEOs, low-status firms are even willing to provide 
a greater reward to overcome the tension coming from status disparity. On 
the other hand, high-status CEOs will face status spillover threat and 
opportunity loss for the advantages of having a high-status affiliation. 
Therefore, in this quadrant, firms need to compensate high-status CEOs for 
having a status spillover effect. This will enable CEOs to enjoy a greater level 
of power in the organization and higher compensation. Also, during 
performance downturns, high-status CEOs at a low-status firm are less 
likely to be dismissed since he is recognized as a significant contributor in 
the organization. 
 So far, we have explored the characteristics of perceived parity and 
disparity in each quadrant and discussed the unfolding of status dynamics 
in each of these four different situations. From now on, we would like to 
address the impact of both absolute and relative value of status on CEO 
governance issues. To capture how the CEO valuation of organizations 
differs by status disparity, we chose CEO power, compensation, and 
dismissal as three CEO-level dependent variables. These three CEO-level 
outcomes are widely considered as a proxy of CEOs value. All these 
dependent variables are causally related with status, and, especially for 
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power and compensation, they can also be mutually reinforcing. However, 
there is a clear theoretical distinction between these concepts, and exploring 
how absolute and relative CEO status affect these variables regardless of 
actual quality of CEO will bring more insights on status effects. 
 
2.4. Hypotheses 
2.4.1. CEO Power   
 CEO power refers to the relative dominance of the CEO in the 
organization (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). CEOs with high managerial power, 
which is driven by the value of available resources, take a significant role in 
the strategic decision-making process (Child, 1972). Status and power are 
highly correlated but conceptually distinct: Status is based on an audiences’ 
evaluation, and power is based on the value of resources which an actor 
beholds. Status, by acting as a positive quality signal and also as a positional 
prestige, allows high-status CEOs to have greater prestige and authority 
over others (Podolny, 2005; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Pearce, 2011). 
Finkelstein (1992) proposed four types of executive power: structural power, 
ownership power, expert power, and prestige power. In this study, we focus 
mostly on structural power, the degree of distribution of formal positions 
within an organization, to capture how organizations value CEO status. We 
propose two behavioral mechanisms regarding CEO structural power as a 
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source of CEO status valuation. On one hand, the board of directors 
attempts to provide high-quality CEO with a greater level of power in order 
to utilize their managerial quality and maximize shareholder value. By 
providing power, CEOs have a high level of managerial discretion to 
influence firm’s strategic choice. With status acting as a quality signal, high-
status CEOs tend to receive a great level of power (Finkelstein, 1992). On the 
other hand, CEO power can be understood as a reward given by the 
organization. In this perspective, the power of CEO is subject to social 
context and perception rather than economic logic (Pfeffer, 1981). Thus, 
proving one’s quality through certification or performance generation 
increases the level of bargaining power of CEO in the organization. For 
example, Wade et al. (2006) found that CEO after gaining status by receiving 
certification for his or her managerial ability tend to have greater prestige 
power in the organization than before (Finkelstein, 1992). 
The effect of CEO status on its power in the organization will be greater 
when there is a status disparity, where a significant status gap exists 
between the CEO and the firm. The level of power reveals the executive’s 
relative standing in the organization. High-status CEOs will be more valued 
in the low-status firm, and low-status firms will allow CEOs to have more 
dominance over the organization. Therefore, we offer the following 
hypotheses to test the impact of absolute and relative value of status on CEO 
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power: 
Hypothesis 1a: Ceteris paribus, high-status CEOs are more likely to have 
greater power than low-status CEOs. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Ceteris paribus, status disparity (CEO relative status to 
firm status) will have a positive impact on CEO power. 
 
2.4.2. CEO Compensation 
Similar to power, CEO compensation signals the significance of the 
underlying value of the CEO in the organization (Daily & Johnson, 1997; 
Bebchuk, Cremers & Peyer, 2006). CEO compensation is a complex system; 
individual, organizational, and sociopolitical factors play a role in the 
determination of executive compensation (Murphy, 1999; Zajac & Westphal, 
1995). Prior studies have found that individual-level factors such as CEO’s 
managerial ability or power (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Bebchuk, Fried & 
Walker, 2002; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Milbourn, 2003) and firm-level factors 
such as firm size and governance structure may influence the amount of 
CEO compensation (Kostiuk, 1990; Boyd, 1994; Baker & Hall; 1998; Core, 
Holthausen & Larcker, 1999). 
Subsequently, there are two distinct approaches explaining the level 
of executive compensation. First, in the optimal contracting approach, the 
board of directors decides compensation level and structure based on 
shareholder value maximization (Mirrlees, 1976; Ross, 1973; Gibbons, 1997). 
In this perspective, CEO status can act as a signal of managerial ability 
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(Graffin et al., 2008; Wade et al., 2006). Moreover, the multiple benefits of 
status affect the board’s positive perception of the managerial ability of CEO 
and willingness to provide greater authority to the executive. Therefore, in 
order to acknowledge the value of executive’s competence, the board of 
directors offers a high-status CEO a greater compensation, presumably to 
create greater stakeholder value. As an alternative approach to optimal 
contracting, managerial power approach suggests that the compensation 
committee do not always operate as a rational system when deciding a pay 
package, but executives exert their power to influence compensation 
arrangement negotiation. (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Here, CEO compensation is 
not only an important indicator of the board’s perception of CEOs, or how 
they value them, but also shows how CEOs value their own contribution to 
the organization and demands a proper reward by exerting his bargaining 
power in the negotiation process. Overall, in both of mechanisms 
determining the level of compensation, the value of CEO status takes an 
important role to both firm and CEO’s side (Belliveau et al., 1996). 
The value of CEO status will be pronounced under status disparity, 
where great inequity of CEO value to reward might occur. Therefore, in the 
case of high-status CEOs working at a low-status firm, CEOs will be more 
likely receive a greater level of compensation with respect to his relative 
significance and opposite will happen to the inverse case. Therefore, we 
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hypothesize as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, high-status CEOs are more likely to 
receive greater compensation than low-status CEOs. 
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, status disparity (CEO relative status to 
firm status) will have a positive impact on CEO compensation. 
 
 
2.4.3. CEO Dismissal Likelihood  
The fit between the organizational characteristics and CEO 
characteristics is important to generate positive firm value (Datta & Guthrie, 
1994). The misfit between the need of organization and the ability of the 
CEO may have a negative impact on organizational performance. Therefore, 
the board of directors continuously evaluate the value added versus the cost 
paid. Though poor firm performance is a major cause of involuntary 
turnover of CEOs (e.g., Fredrickson and Hambrick, 1988; Denis and Kruse, 
2000), not every CEO might face the same level of dismissal threat for 
performance downturn. Often times, the process of CEO selection and 
succession is less explainable by economic logic than by social psychological 
and sociopolitical factors. Although top executives’ decision plays a crucial 
role in firm operation (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), it is difficult to attribute 
firm performance solely to executives because external environmental 
factors also affect organizations (Thompson, 1967). To reduce this ambiguity 
and the lack of information, stakeholders tend to rely on legitimate third-
party evaluators, such as investor analysts (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011), 
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media evaluations (Deephouse, 2000; Chen & Meindl, 1991) and also socially 
constructive perceptions, like status or reputation (Barron & Rolfe, 2012). 
CEO status will contribute to the director’s positive evaluation of CEO’s 
efficacy, resulting in lower probability of CEO dismissal. Therefore, high-
status CEOs might enjoy more favorable performance aspirations (Ocasio, 
1994) and are less likely to be dismissed than low-status counterparts even 
when they face the same performance downturn (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, 
& Hambrick, 2008). Furthermore, when there is a wide status disparity 
between the CEO and the firm, CEO’s relative standing will determine 
CEO’s influence and significance over the organization (Frank, 1985). So that 
even two CEOs with same social status face performance downturn, CEOs 
with greater status disparity will exert his managerial power to protect 
oneself from turnover (Flickinger, Wrage, Tuschke & Bresser, 2015). 
Therefore, a high-status CEO at a relatively low-status firm will be less likely 
to be dismissed. On the contrary, a low-status CEO at a high-status firm will 
be more likely to be dismissed, making the CEO a scapegoat of low 
performance (Shen & Cho, 2005). Therefore, we hypothesize as following: 
Hypothesis 3a: Ceteris paribus, high-status CEOs are less likely to be 
dismissed than low-status CEOs. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Ceteris paribus, status disparity (CEO relative status to 





We tested the hypotheses using the sample of CEOs in 
EXECUCOMP database for the years 2002 to 2006 inclusive. We dropped the 
panel data containing any missing values because data for all sample firms 
were not available in the database. The final sample consists of 2,526 CEO 
observations. 
3.2. Measures 
3.2.1. Dependent Variables 
CEO power. We used CEO duality as a proxy for CEO power 
(Finkelstein, 1992). We coded “1” when CEO holds chairman position in a 
given year, and “0” otherwise. The data was obtained from Standard & 
Poor’s EXECUCOMP database.   
CEO compensation (absolute). By using Standard &Poor’s 
EXECUCOMP database, we collected CEO’s annual total compensation in a 
given year (EXECUCOMP item TDC1). EXECUCOMP provides data on 
salary, bonus, stock options, and other total compensation for the top five 
executives in the firm. 
CEO compensation (relative).  To obtain relative CEO compensation 
among top executives, we calculated the relative proportion of the CEO’s 
total compensation with respect to the other top five executives. Total 
compensation includes salary, bonus, other annual pay, long-term incentive 
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payouts, the total value of restricted stock granted that year, the Black-
Scholes value of stock options granted that year, and all other total 
compensation (EXECUCOMP item TDC 1) (Liu & Jiraporn, 2010). We 
calculated the portion of CEO compensation among top five executives 
including the CEO. 
CEO dismissal. Following Shen and Cannella (2002), we examined 
news report on CEO turnover from Factiva and Lexis-Nexis. We analyzed 
news articles to define the reason of CEO turnover. We categorized as 
voluntary turnover if any of following reasons was found: (1) CEO’s death 
or health problems, (2) CEO’s acceptance of a similar position at another 
firm, or (3) merger or acquisition. Also, we categorized as CEO dismissal if 
any of following reasons were found: (1) the article directly reports that CEO 
was fired, (2) CEO have involved in crime, (3) CEO was resigned 
immediately or unexpectedly due to poor performance or undisclosed 
personal reasons, (4) CEO took early retirement with performance problems. 
 
3.2.2. Independent Variables 
 
CEO status. We assessed CEO status using data of recipients of 
BusinessWeek’s Best Managers of the Year Award. During our sample period, 20 
recipients of U.S. firms were awarded on average each year after excluding 
non-U.S. firms and small firms whose data accessibility was problematic. 
 24 
First, we computed a variable indicating whether a CEO won an award in a 
current year and previous five years (1=yes, 0=no at time t). Next, we 
followed the formula of Bowers, Greve, Mitsuhashi & Baum (2014)’s formula, 
which weighs the value of status by its recency: a sum of 1/(yeart – year of 
award). 
Firm status. Following prior research on social status, we measured 
firm status with Fortune’s Most Admired Companies list (e.g., Lin et al., 2009). 
This annual survey covers Fortune 1000 and Fortune Global 500 firms and is 
evaluated by its peer CEOs, executives, directors, and financial analysts. We 
first excluded non-U.S. firms from our data and computed a dummy 
variable indicating firms listed in Fortune’s Most Admired Companies in the 
current year and previous three years (1=yes, 0=no at time t). Then, we again 
adopted the formula of Bowers et al. (2014)’s and calculated the weighted 
value of status by its recency: a sum of 1/(yeart – year listed). 
Status disparity. Status disparity represents relative dominance of 
CEO status over firm status. To capture relative standing of CEO status over 
firm status, we subtract standardized score of Firm status from CEO status. 
We standardized each variable in order to control the variance difference 
between two variables.  
 
3.2.3. Control Variables 
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Firm size. We defined firm size as a logarithm of a firm’s total assets. 
Data was collected from COMPUSTAT database. 
Firm performance. Return on equity (ROE) was used for accounting 
firm performance measure, which was calculated by the formula (ROE = net 
income / stakeholder’s equity). 
Industry return. Since our data includes multiple industries, we 
tried to control industry variance by industry return. We coded as the same 
industry when company shared two-digit SIC codes. Then, we calculated 
industry return with following formula (Wade et al., 2006; Graffin et al., 
2008). Data was collected from COMPUSTAT database. 
Industry Return 𝑖𝑗 = ∑ (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗) /
(∑ (𝑖𝑗 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗), 
where i is each company in industry j for a given year. 
CEO tenure. CEO tenure was calculated by the number of years he 
or she has been employed as the CEO. We collected data from company 
profiles from business related journals like Forbes and Businessweek. 
Outside CEO. We created a dummy variable to control the effect of 
outsiderness on dependent variables. We coded “1’ when CEO’s company 
tenure and CEO tenure was equal or less than three, and “0” otherwise.   
New CEO. We also included New CEO dummy variable. We coded 
“1” if one became CEO in past three years including a current year, and “0” 
 26 
otherwise. 
CEO Duality. This dummy variable, which shows CEO having 
chairman position in his organization, was only included in testing 
hypotheses 3a and 3b on CEO dismissal likelihood. 
CEO 6163 / CEO 64. To control the CEO age effect on CEO dismissal, 
we coded two dummy variables (Cannella & Shen, 2001; Ocasio, 1994; 
Zhang, 2006). Following Zhang (2006), Age6163 was coded “1” if CEO age 
was 61, 62, or 63 in a current year, and “0” otherwise. Age64up was coded “1” 
if CEO age was 64 or older in a current year, and “0” otherwise. These 
dummies were only included in testing hypotheses 3a and 3b on CEO 
dismissal likelihood. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
First, since the data on CEO status and firm status are released to 
the public on the different month of the year, we expected some temporal 
lag for CEO status and status disparity to materialize. Therefore, we 
adopted a lag structure which uses the values at the end of fiscal year t for 
independent and control variables and t+1 for dependent variables to 
effectively detect the effect of status.  
Second, we address the issue of unobserved CEO and firm 
heterogeneity by constructing a panel data set and including both CEO and 
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firm fixed effects in the model. The fixed effects model, by controlling time-
invariant characteristics, mitigates such concerns as cross-sectional 
heterogeneity and endogeneity. Also, using a Hausman (1978)’s test, we 
found that there is a correlation between the independent variables and 
unobserved variables that are not controlled for. Thus, the fixed-effects 
model was once again confirmed. Our analyses were estimated using xtreg 
function in STATA with the fixed effects option (fe). For binary dependent 
variables, CEO Power (CEO duality) and CEO Dismissal, we employed 
logistic (the xtlogit routine in STATA) and rare event logistic model (relogit 
routine in STATA). Models are estimated with robust standard errors to 
control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of variables, including 
observation numbers, means, standard deviations, and correlations. All 
variance inflation factors were below three with the average of 1.65, which 
suggests that standard errors are not being inflated by factors significantly. 
Therefore, we assume that multicollinearity does not exist in these variables.  
The results of analyses testing Hypothesis 1a and 1b on CEO power 
are shown in Table 2. We estimated that CEO status and status disparity will 
have a positive impact on the level of CEO power. Model 1 is a control 
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model and Model 2 and 3 explores the statistical significance of the 
relationship between variables. All of the results support Hypothesis 1a and 
1b, and tell that both absolute and relative value of CEO status is an 
important factor for determining the level of CEO power in the organization. 
In Hypothesis 2a and 2b, we expected that both absolute and relative status 
of CEO over the firm will also have a positive impact on compensation level. 
Table 3 presents the results of the analyses on CEO total compensation and 
Table 4 shows the results of the analyses on relative CEO compensation 
among top five executives. In each table, Model 2 shows the statistical 
significance of Hypothesis 2a, which predicts the positive influence of CEO 
status on CEO compensation. Status, as a quality signal, increases the 
significance of CEO in the organization. Model 3 shows that the coefficient 
on the status disparity is positive and significant. This suggests that the 
high-level of CEO status dominance over the firm status will result in a 
greater level of CEO compensation. Taken together, both Hypothesis 2a and 
Hypothesis 2b were supported. 
Table 5 reports the estimates of the logistic models with the 
dependent variable of CEO dismissal. Using Model 2 and 3, we investigate 
the level of statistical support for Hypothesis 3a and 3b. First, Hypothesis 3a 
predicts the positive relationship between CEO status and CEO dismissal 
likelihood. However, there was no significant effect this relationship. 
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Hypothesis 3b predicts that, if all things are equal, the status disparity 
between CEO status and firm status decreases the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal. Model 3 in Table 5 tests this prediction. The results suggest that 
status disparity is not a significant factor for CEO dismissal, suggesting that 
relative standing of CEO in the organization did not act as a quality signal in 
performance downturn. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is not supported. In 
addition, only the Model 3 has shown the significant positive impact of firm 
status on dismissal likelihood, which was included as a control variable. 
Taken together, the result suggests that both absolute and relative value of 
CEO status does not impact the level of CEO dismissal likelihood. To further 
analyze this relationship, we tested how unexpected performance variation 
affects the relationship between CEO status and CEO dismissal likelihood by 
conducting additional analysis. We utilized performance extremeness, which 
was calculated by following the procedure described by Sanders & 
Hambrick (2007). We first estimated “predicted performance” by regressing 
firm performance on control variables: past performance, firm size and 
industry return. Then we obtained an absolute value of residuals from the 
regression, which represents the difference between actual and expected 
performance. Table 6 shows the results of rare events logistic regression on 
CEO dismissal likelihood (King & Zeng, 2001). We found that the 
moderating effect of performance extremeness on CEO dismissal is greater 
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when the status disparity is high. This indicates that CEOs with greater 
status disparity are more likely to be appreciated for their unexpected 









Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Firm status 0.046** 0.044** 0.067*** 
 (0.02) (0.02 (0.02) 
Firm size 0.113*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 
 (0.03) (0.0) (0.03) 
Firm performance -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry return 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CEO tenure -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
New CEO -0.094* -0.087*** -0.087*** 
 (0.03 (0.03) (0.03) 
CEO status  0.023***  
  (0.01)  
Status disparity   0.028*** 
   (0.01) 
Constant -0.034 0.0630 0.063 
 (0.33) (0.330) (0.33) 
    
Observations 2,526 2,526 2,526 
R-squared 0.027 0.031 0.031 
Number of id 658 658 658 
Standard errors in parentheses 









CEO Compensation (Absolute) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Firm status -0.029 -0.037 0.079 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Firm size -0.137 -0.195** -0.195** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Firm performance -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry return 0.030 0.028 0.028 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
CEO tenure 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
New CEO 0.003 0.0370 0.037 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CEO status  0.116***  
  (0.02)  
Status disparity   0.147*** 
   (0.03) 
Constant 9.745*** 10.242*** 10.242*** 
 (0.83) (0.83) (0.83) 
    
Observations 2,526 2,526 2,526 
R-squared 0.027 0.043 0.043 
Number of id 658 658 658 
Standard errors in parentheses 












CEO Compensation (Relative) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Firm status 0.008 0.007 0.014** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm size -0.075*** -0.078*** -0.078*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm performance -0.001 -0.00119 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry return 0.004 0.00408 0.004 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO tenure 0.005** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
New CEO 0.000 0.002 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CEO status  0.006**  
 
Status disparity 
 (0.00)  
0.008** 
   (0.00) 
Constant 1.118*** 1.145*** 1.145*** 
 (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) 
    
Observations 2,526 2,526 2,526 
R-squared 0.025 0.028 0.028 
Number of id 658 658 658 
Standard errors in parentheses 










Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Firm status 0.230 0.215 0.287* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) 
Firm size 0.063 0.060 0.060 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Firm performance -0.110 -0.110 -0.110 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Industry return 0.065 0.067 0.067 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
CEO duality 0.297 0.296 0.296 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) 
CEO tenure -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
New CEO -1.548** -1.516* -1.516* 
 (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) 
Outside CEO 0.681* 0.670* 0.670* 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) 
Age6163 0.240 0.262 0.262 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) 
Age64 -0.703 -0.673 -0.673 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) 
CEO status  0.073  
  (0.12)  
Status disparity   0.092 
   (0.15) 
Constant -4.776*** -4.758*** -4.758*** 
 (1.49) (1.50) (1.50) 
    
Observations 2,526 2,526 2,526 
Number of id 658 658 658 
Standard errors in parentheses 




















 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.23) (0.23) 
Firm size 0.090 0.087 0.088 0.087 0.071 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Firm performance 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.078*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry return 0.05 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.045 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
CEO duality 0.019 0.024 0.005 0.024 -0.002 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) 
CEO tenure -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.014 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
New CEO -0.595 -0.587 -0.581 -0.587 -0.612 
 (0.78) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) 
Outsider CEO 0.977** 0.967** 0.972** 0.967** 0.987** 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) 
Age6163 0.049 0.057 0.091 0.057 0.085 
 (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) 
Age64 -0.678 -0.666 -0.646 -0.666 -0.656 
 (0.57) (0.56) (0.57) (0.56) (0.57) 
Performance extremeness -6.692* -6.670* -6.771* -6.670* -6.866** 
 (3.49) (3.49) (3.49) (3.49) (3.49) 
CEO status  0.066 0.103   
  (0.12) (0.12)   
CEO status *  
Performance extremeness 
   
2.320 
  
   (1.57)   
Status disparity    0.084 0.095 
    (0.15) (0.16) 
Status disparity *  
Performance extremeness 
     
3.287*** 
     (1.22) 
Constant -4.999*** -4.971*** -4.966*** -4.971*** -4.825** 
 (1.91) (1.90) (1.91) (1.90) (1.90) 
      
Observations 1,868 1,868 1,868 1,868 1,868 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The object of this study was to examine the effect of CEO status and 
firm status on corporate governance issues like CEO power, compensation, 
and dismissal likelihood. Our study makes three broad contributions to the 
status and corporate governance literature. First, we aimed to extend the 
status literature by linking two different levels of status and focusing on the 
status disparity between those two, which represents the relative dominance 
of CEO status over firm status. We expected that actors perceive the value of 
status not just in an absolute term, but also in a relative term so that one’s 
social setting will influence the relative value of status. The findings of this 
research highlight that CEO status has both an absolute and relative value 
and both influence a perceived significance of CEO over the organization. 
Current literature on status emphasizes the nature and advantages of 
status homophily (e.g., Podolny, 1993; 1994). Status homophily reduces 
uncertainty and risk and expects partners to contribute to an equal level of 
commitment (McPherson et al., 2001). However, the motive of status 
heterophily has been relatively less examined (except few studies such as 
Castellucci & Ertug (2010) and Shipilov, Li & Greve (2011)). This study 
contributes to the current evolving literature on status heterophily by both 
examining status dynamics between the CEO and the firm. In our research 
context, for high-status CEOs working at a low-status firm, firms, to attract 
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high-status CEOs, provide an additional premium to compensate CEO’s cost 
of status spillover to the firm. The additional premium given by the firm was 
captured through CEO power, total compensation, and relative 
compensation among top five executives.     
In addition, our results suggest that while status has a strong 
relationship with executive power and compensation level, it has relatively 
weak linkage with CEO dismissal likelihood. The finding distinguishes the 
different characteristics of CEO governance inside the organization and CEO 
termination. This suggests that the organization’s decision on CEO reward 
and termination decision somehow have a different mechanism. We can 
explain this by two different approaches. First, a greater cost may be 
associated with dismissal. When deciding CEO termination, the board of 
directors has to consider the subsequent cost of searching for a new CEO or 
adapting to overall change after CEO succession. Therefore, the impact of 
status as a quality signal on CEO dismissal can be weaker compared to its 
impact on CEO power or CEO compensation. The second approach deals 
with the associated cost of having high-status CEOs. If the cost of 
maintaining the relationship with high-status CEO is considerable, the board 
of directors might have stricter standards on performance evaluation. 
Merton (1968b) argues that while high-status actors enjoy Matthew Effect, 
which allows them to gain status and generate performance benefits more 
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easily, they are also bound to inverse Matthew Effect, suggesting high-status 
leaders are more subject to face harsh reaction when the expected 
performance is not realized. We found general support for this explanation 
through the examination of the moderating effect of performance 
extremeness in additional analyses. Therefore, organizations, especially 
when the status disparity is high, might have two different cost mechanisms 
that affect executive termination. 
 Although we adopted one of the widely used measurements of status 
in the literature, the proxies still do not comprehensively capture how the 
CEO and the firm themselves perceive status and compare with theirs. The 
measurement of status can be largely divided into three types, network 
centrality (e.g., Jensen, 2008), deference (e.g., Washingon & Zajac, 2005) and 
ranking (e.g., Philips & Zuckerman, 2001). Among these various types of 
status operationalization, we chose to use ranking measure on both CEO and 
firm-level status. Because network centrality and deference capture the 
subject’s relative position in the certain network, these two measurements 
are more suitable to the context where there is a defined set of players and 
audiences in the market. For example, studies examining status of the 
venture capital (Pollock et al., 2015) or inter-organizational partner selection 
(Chandler, Haunschild, Rhee & Beckman., 2013) take these 
operationalization types. But, in our research context, we focus on the CEO 
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and the firm’s status as the signal for quality, which makes ranking as an 
ideal proxy to capture status. However, this measurement has a limitation 
since it assumes that status evaluation will be equal regardless of audience 
types. Although closely related, the board of directors inside the 
organization may have a different set of standard for evaluating a manager’s 
status compared to those stakeholders outside the organization. Future 
research should consider developing audience-specific proxies for status and 
explore how the public’s evaluation and the board of director’s evaluation 
on CEO status can differ by context.  
The dynamic characteristics of status have been increasingly 
captured in status research recently (e.g., Ozmel & Guler, 2014; Cowen, 2012). 
However, the linkage between two different types of status has been 
limitedly examined. Our framework of absolute and relative level of status 
needs to be applied to various topics and settings. While current research 
explicitly focuses on major issues of CEO governance (CEO power, 
compensation and dismissal likelihood), future research might examine this 
framework in more specific issues on corporate governance and explore how 
the impact of absolute and relative status differ by various governance issues. 
Although our study focused limitedly on the level of total compensation and 
relative compensation among top five executive, future research could 
consider their effects on compensation structure. For example, CEOs with a 
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high level of status disparity with their firm might receive a greater amount 
of perquisites compared to CEOs with a low level of status disparity.  
Also, future studies can examine the level of attribution on positive 
and negative performance to high- and low-status CEOs. High-status actors 
are considered to be more superior in terms of its ability and quality than 
low-status actors (Lynn et al., 2009). Thus, high-status CEOs may be more 
attributed to positive performance than low-status actors for the same level 
of performance outcome, which can result in greater pay gain after an 
earnings surprise. We found the evidence of attribution discrepancy on 
performance extremeness by the level of CEO status (Table 6). Further 
analyzing how positive and negative deviation from expected performance 
affect CEO dismissal likelihood would provide clearer insight on how CEO 
status affects performance attribution to the CEO. Furthermore, this 
framework can be also applied to inter-organizational relationship research 
and deepen our understanding of status homophilous and heterophilous ties 
in the network. For example, by extending Shen, Tang & Chen (2014), we 
can apply this framework to examine how exchange participants define 
one’s role based on their absolute and relative level of status. We hope future 
research extends our understanding of status dynamics by further exploring 
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